

Price of clean air: Evidence from Chinese ESG mutual funds

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
Hoje Jo (Santa Clara Univ.)

Hee-Eun Kim (Myongji Univ.)*

Xin Xu (Guangdong University of Finance and Economics)

Motivation

- **Air pollution** can be an important non-financial consideration in investment decisions.
 - China is one of the most polluted countries.
 - As the Chinese government's efforts to improve air quality, investors are increasingly aware of the importance of sustainability.
- Previous studies link China's air pollution to investor behaviors.
 - [Li et al. \(2019 JFE\)](#), [Huang et al. \(2020 MS\)](#): air pollution affects **investors' mood** and significantly increases the disposition effect.
- We argue that air pollution affects **investor preference** and investment choice to create environmental change.
 - Combating air pollution has become a critical **social norm** (Becker, 1957; Arrow, 1972; Hong and Kacperczyk, 2009) in China.



Source: China Daily Asia, "Beijing sees first red alert over smog" By Zheng Jinran (December 7, 2015)

Research Questions

- Our research question:
 - *Do Chinese ESG funds underperform conventional funds?*
 - *Do investors are willing to pay for environmental impact? How much?*
- Unlike ESG or SRI investing, impact investors are willing to forgo financial returns for non-pecuniary benefits.
 - Barber et al. (2021, JFE) study impact funds and show that investors accept 2.5–3.7 ppts lower IRRs.
- Our paper is different from previous study in that we
 - (1) suggest that ESG funds act as **impact investments** in a specific circumstance (high air pollution period), and,
 - (2) thus, **sacrifice financial returns** in exchange for clean air.

Hypotheses development

- There are competing hypotheses regarding ESG funds' future performance.
 - Underperform conventional funds because their screening process constrains the investment universe (Renneboog et al., 2008, 2011).
 - Outperform conventional funds because ESG screens may eliminate poorly managed firms with underperforming stocks (Edmans, 2011; In et al., 2019).
 - Nevertheless, most literature shows that SRI funds perform similarly to conventional funds (Renneboog et al., 2008, 2011) or significantly underperform (El Ghouli and Karoui, 2017).
- Barber et al. (2021) investors are willing to accept lower financial returns for impact investing.
 - Willingness-to-pay (WTP) models investors accept 2.5–3.7 ppts lower IRRs ex ante for impact funds.

H1: ESG funds underperform conventional funds following the high air pollution period.

Data: ESG and non-ESG sample

- Base fund sample: China's open-end equity and equity-oriented hybrid funds (2014-2020).
 - Obtain from CSMAR: fund TNA, age, turnover, expense, fund return on a quarterly basis
- ESG funds
 - Identified 127 pan-ESG mutual funds by the Syntao Green Finance and China SIF (as of October 2020).
 - The number (% TNA) of ESG funds was 11 (1.4%) in 2014 and has increased to 42 (6.6%) in 2020.
 - Environmental fund accounts for the highest majority of ESG funds to pursue environmental sustainability.

Table 1. ESG and Non-ESG sample construction

| Panel A. Summary of Pan-ESG equity mutual funds | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|-----------------|----|---|---|-------|----------------------|--------|------|------|-------|-----------------------------------|--------|
| Year | Number of funds | | | | | TNA (in billion RMB) | | | | | ESG funds (%) of all equity funds | |
| | ESG | E | S | G | Other | ESG | E | S | G | Other | By number of funds | By TNA |
| 2014 | 11 | 6 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 9.51 | 1.50 | 0.77 | 0.12 | 7.13 | 2.24 | 1.37 |
| 2015 | 16 | 11 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 25.75 | 17.13 | 4.87 | 0.05 | 3.69 | 2.58 | 3.17 |
| 2016 | 26 | 21 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 29.13 | 25.85 | 3.01 | 0.16 | 0.11 | 2.67 | 2.76 |
| 2017 | 32 | 27 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 32.94 | 26.64 | 3.84 | 0.20 | 2.26 | 2.60 | 2.90 |
| 2018 | 38 | 33 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 24.29 | 20.06 | 2.51 | 0.05 | 1.67 | 2.70 | 3.06 |
| 2019 | 42 | 37 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 34.14 | 29.43 | 2.73 | 0.11 | 1.87 | 2.62 | 3.08 |
| 2020 | 42 | 37 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 107.71 | 102.30 | 1.96 | 0.26 | 3.19 | 2.59 | 6.55 |

Data: ESG and non-ESG sample

• Matching Non-ESG funds

- Propensity score matching methodology (fund TNA, fund family TNA, fund return, fund family return, alpha, and expense ratio)
- Conduct a 3:1 nearest neighbor matching, results in **38 ESG funds** and **109 non-ESG funds**.
- After matching, the average fund size, age, flows, and performance of the ESG funds are similar to those of the non-ESG funds.

Table 1. ESG and Non-ESG sample construction

| Panel B. Fund sample before matching | | | | | | | |
|--------------------------------------|-------------------|---------|--------|-------------------------------|---------|--------|-------------|
| | Mean | Std.Dev | Median | Mean | Std.Dev | Median | t-statistic |
| | ESG funds (n=786) | | | Conventional funds (n=29,439) | | | Difference |
| LnTNA | 5.844 | 1.680 | 5.794 | 5.654 | 1.771 | 5.763 | 2.95*** |
| lnAge | 3.837 | 0.639 | 3.861 | 3.921 | 0.685 | 3.932 | -3.39*** |
| Expense | 0.019 | 0.045 | 0.015 | 0.032 | 0.105 | 0.015 | -3.42*** |
| Volatility | 0.014 | 0.007 | 0.013 | 0.013 | 0.007 | 0.012 | 7.30*** |
| Flow | 0.795 | 7.694 | -0.041 | 1.634 | 11.115 | -0.046 | -2.05*** |
| Return | 0.056 | 0.144 | 0.035 | 0.048 | 0.124 | 0.030 | 1.78* |
| Perf | 0.519 | 0.307 | 0.520 | 0.499 | 0.287 | 0.499 | 1.87* |
| CAPM Alpha | 0.025 | 0.075 | 0.020 | 0.021 | 0.065 | 0.015 | 1.65* |
| 3-factor Alpha | 0.011 | 0.070 | 0.011 | 0.006 | 0.055 | 0.007 | 2.45** |
| 4-factor Alpha | 0.018 | 0.070 | 0.013 | 0.011 | 0.055 | 0.009 | 3.55*** |
| Panel C. Fund sample after matching | | | | | | | |
| | ESG funds (n=667) | | | Non-ESG funds (n=1,669) | | | Difference |
| LnTNA | 5.762 | 1.689 | 5.550 | 5.766 | 1.735 | 5.854 | -0.05 |
| lnAge | 3.893 | 0.598 | 3.892 | 3.911 | 0.629 | 3.892 | -0.65 |
| Expense | 0.020 | 0.048 | 0.015 | 0.019 | 0.046 | 0.014 | 0.25 |
| Volatility | 0.014 | 0.007 | 0.013 | 0.013 | 0.006 | 0.012 | 4.40*** |
| Flow | 0.861 | 8.159 | -0.042 | 1.025 | 9.032 | -0.044 | -0.40 |
| Return | 0.058 | 0.142 | 0.038 | 0.056 | 0.127 | 0.038 | 0.29 |
| Perf | 0.521 | 0.302 | 0.522 | 0.520 | 0.289 | 0.540 | -0.06 |
| CAPM Alpha | 0.025 | 0.074 | 0.020 | 0.026 | 0.067 | 0.021 | -0.35 |
| 3-factor Alpha | 0.010 | 0.069 | 0.011 | 0.011 | 0.055 | 0.009 | -0.09 |
| 4-factor Alpha | 0.017 | 0.069 | 0.012 | 0.016 | 0.055 | 0.011 | 0.55 |

Data: Air Quality Index


- World Air Quality Index (www.aqicn.org) with an open data framework.
 - Since 2014, has provided city-based daily concentrations of air pollutants such as PM2.5, PM10, nitrogen dioxide, etc.
 - PM2.5: can enter the bloodstream, directly affect human health
- Construct AQI_{PM} at a quarterly frequency:

$$AQI_t = \sum_{i=1}^{10} AQI_{i,t}$$

- 10 largest cities: **Beijing, Chengdu, Chongqing, Guangzhou, Hangzhou, Nanjing, Shanghai, Shenyang, Tianjin, and Wuhan.**
 1. by population
 2. tier 1 and tier2 cities to consider the extent of economic and financial development
 3. exclude adjacent cities within one province to consider geographical distribution.



Source: www.aqicn.org



Data: Air Quality Index

| Air Quality Index - Particulate Matter | |
|--|--------------------------------|
| 301 – 500 | Hazardous |
| 201 – 300 | Very Unhealthy |
| 151 – 200 | Unhealthy |
| 101 – 150 | Unhealthy for Sensitive Groups |
| 51 – 100 | Moderate |
| 0 – 50 | Good |

- Identify high (low) air pollution periods based on the median value of the sample period.
 - Assuming that AQI affects aggregate investor preference, use the nationwide time-series variation in AQI.
- China was exposed to unhealthy air quality.
 - The average *AQI* was 123 $\mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$.
 - high *AQI* periods: average 141.7 $\mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$, max. value of 173.4 $\mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$, mostly issuing “red alert.”
 - low *AQI* periods: average 105.5 $\mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$

Table 2. Summary statistics of AQI

| Panel A. PM2.5 level ($\mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$) by cities | | | | | |
|--|-----------|---------|---------|---------|---------|
| City | Mean | Std.Dev | Median | Min | Max |
| Beijing | 123.599 | 26.291 | 116.237 | 87.098 | 187.289 |
| Chengdu | 132.028 | 25.878 | 129.967 | 76.835 | 182.100 |
| Chongqing | 125.409 | 26.786 | 128.383 | 71.989 | 177.767 |
| Guangzhou | 95.887 | 20.835 | 92.600 | 58.576 | 137.411 |
| Hangzhou | 127.963 | 23.912 | 127.811 | 87.120 | 169.644 |
| Nanjing | 123.573 | 25.766 | 121.315 | 76.511 | 176.811 |
| Shanghai | 107.000 | 17.552 | 105.319 | 79.580 | 135.167 |
| Shenyang | 127.166 | 29.665 | 119.102 | 82.380 | 188.101 |
| Tianjin | 130.758 | 25.144 | 127.200 | 93.696 | 189.011 |
| Wuhan | 142.430 | 30.373 | 136.209 | 90.275 | 209.900 |
| Panel B. PM2.5 level ($\mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$) of AQI measure | | | | | |
| <i>AQI</i> | 123.602 | 23.327 | 120.218 | 81.896 | 173.437 |
| High <i>AQI</i> period | 141.687 | 16.278 | 141.352 | 120.634 | 173.437 |
| Low <i>AQI</i> period | 105.516 | 12.675 | 107.594 | 81.896 | 119.803 |
| Difference (t-statistics) | 36.171*** | (6.560) | | | |

Empirical analysis

- (1) Air pollution and Fund future performance → Panel regression
- (2) Ex-ante willingness-to-pay estimation → develop a discrete choice model
- (3) Ex-post performance estimation → estimate portfolio alpha
- (5) Robustness tests

Empirical results (H1)

- To examine the future performance of ESG funds following the high air pollution period, we use the following regression model:

$$\mathbf{Alpha}_{i,t} = \alpha + \beta_1 \mathbf{ESG}_i + \beta_2 \mathbf{ESG}_i * \mathbf{AQI}_{t-1}^{\mathbf{High}} + \beta_3 \mathbf{AQI}_{t-1}^{\mathbf{High}} + \gamma \mathbf{Controls}_{i,t-1} + \varepsilon_{i,t+1}$$

- $\mathbf{Alpha}_{i,t}$: the future risk-adjusted performance of fund i in quarter t based on the CAPM, Fama and French's (1993) three-factor model, and Carhart's (1997) four-factor model, respectively.
- \mathbf{ESG}_i : a dummy variable equal to one if a fund i is the ESG fund.
- $\mathbf{AQI}_{t-1}^{\mathbf{High}}$: a dummy variable equal to one if the quarter $t-1$ lies in the high air pollution periods and zero otherwise.
- The control variables include fund size, age, expenses, fund return volatility, and past fund flows.
- We adjust standard errors for clustering at the time level.

Empirical results (H1)

Table 4. AQI and future performance of ESG funds

| Alpha = | Excess Return | | CAPM Alpha | | 3-factor Alpha | | 4-factor Alpha | |
|--------------------------|--------------------|---------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
| $AQI^{High}_{t-1} * ESG$ | | -0.023** (-2.12) | | -0.019** (-2.24) | | -0.018* (-1.98) | | -0.012 (-1.32) |
| AQI^{High}_{t-1} | | -0.081** (-2.15) | | -0.024* (-1.73) | | -0.020* (-1.84) | | -0.022* (-2.05) |
| ESG | -0.005 (-0.66) | 0.005 (0.47) | -0.004 (-0.69) | 0.004 (0.53) | 0.001 (0.22) | 0.008 (1.14) | 0.003 (0.60) | 0.008 (1.04) |
| $LnTNA_{t-1}$ | -0.001 (-0.59) | 0.000 (0.07) | 0.001 (0.79) | 0.001 (1.13) | 0.001 (1.38) | 0.001 (1.57) | 0.001 (1.65) | 0.002* (1.77) |
| $LnAge_{t-1}$ | 0.002 (0.51) | -0.000 (-0.10) | -0.001 (-0.55) | -0.002 (-1.00) | -0.004** (-2.14) | -0.005** (-2.58) | -0.003 (-1.24) | -0.004 (-1.70) |
| $Expense_{t-1}$ | -0.099* (-1.91) | -0.076 (-1.48) | -0.086*** (-3.01) | -0.077*** (-2.80) | -0.090*** (-3.63) | -0.082*** (-3.36) | -0.084*** (-4.02) | -0.076*** (-3.56) |
| $Volatility_{t-1}$ | 4.394 (1.27) | 4.390 (1.52) | 2.042** (2.35) | 2.044*** (2.82) | -0.648 (-0.60) | -0.646 (-0.61) | -0.674 (-0.82) | -0.673 (-0.79) |
| $Flow_{t-1}$ | 0.000 (0.33) | -0.000 (-0.49) | 0.000*** (2.94) | 0.000** (2.26) | 0.000* (2.02) | 0.000 (1.38) | 0.000* (1.72) | 0.000 (1.10) |
| $Intercept$ | -0.002 (-0.04) | 0.029 (0.58) | 0.003 (0.17) | 0.013 (0.77) | 0.032** (2.13) | 0.041** (2.76) | 0.030* (1.90) | 0.039** (2.52) |
| Observations | 2175 | 2175 | 2175 | 2175 | 2175 | 2175 | 2175 | 2175 |
| R-squared | 0.049 | 0.150 | 0.041 | 0.086 | 0.014 | 0.061 | 0.014 | 0.060 |

→ Support H1: ESG funds **underperform** conventional funds following the **high air pollution period**.

Empirical results (ex-ante WTP)

- If ESG investors derive their utility primarily from non-financial considerations and care less about financial performance than conventional investors, we expect that they are willing to sacrifice returns.
- We develop a discrete choice model following Barber et al. (2021). We begin with a random utility model in which investors face a binary choice of whether to invest in fund i :

$$y_i^* = f(\mathbb{E}[r_i], X_i, AQI, e_i)$$

- $\mathbb{E}[r_i]$ represent the expected return
- X_i is the observable vector of nonprice fund characteristics such as fund size, age, and expense
- AQI represents the air quality index that enters into the investment decision of the environmentally-conscious investors
- e_i is an error term representing unobserved attributes

Empirical results (ex-ante WTP)

- We use logit estimation with the base sample of equity mutual funds.
- The dependent variable is assigned one of two outcomes: 1 = invest in ESG funds (ESG fund has positive fund inflows) and 0 = not invest in ESG funds. The probability that we observe $y_i = 1$ is given by:

$$\Pr[y_i = 1] = \alpha + \beta * \mathbb{E}[r_i] + \gamma' * X_i + \delta * AQI + \varepsilon_i$$

- $\mathbb{E}[r_i]$ is the quarterly expected returns calculated by the CAPM, Fama and French's (1993) three-factor model, and Carhart's (1997) four-factor model.
 - X_i is a vector of fund attributes, including fund size, age, and expenses at quarter-end immediately preceding the investment.
 - AQI is the standardized value of AQI in the quarter immediately preceding the investment.
- The WTP for ESG funds is derived from the equation as follows:

$$WTP = -\frac{\partial \mathbb{E}[r]}{\partial AQI} = -\frac{\left(\frac{\partial \Pr[y=1]}{\partial AQI}\right)}{\left(\frac{\partial \Pr[y=1]}{\partial \mathbb{E}[r]}\right)} = -\frac{\delta}{\beta}$$

Empirical results (ex-ante WTP)

Table 5. Ex-ante willingness-to-pay estimation

| Expected return = | using daily returns in the last three months | | | using monthly data in the previous 36 months | | |
|------------------------------------|--|----------------------|----------------------|--|---------------------|----------------------|
| | CAPM model | 3-factor model | 4-factor model | CAPM model | 3-factor model | 4-factor model |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| <i>Expected return_t</i> | -1.585 (-1.63) | -1.295 (-1.60) | -1.213 (-1.58) | -1.192 (-0.42) | -3.076 (-1.52) | -1.951 (-1.30) |
| <i>LnTNA_{t-1}</i> | -0.040*** (-2.66) | -0.040*** (-2.68) | -0.041*** (-2.70) | -0.039*** (-2.59) | -0.039** (-2.57) | -0.039*** (-2.62) |
| <i>LnAge_{t-1}</i> | 0.245*** (6.50) | 0.247*** (6.53) | 0.246*** (6.52) | 0.242*** (6.43) | 0.242*** (6.43) | 0.244*** (6.47) |
| <i>Expense_{t-1}</i> | 2.331*** (4.29) | 2.329*** (4.28) | 2.327*** (4.28) | 2.342*** (4.30) | 2.341*** (4.30) | 2.340*** (4.30) |
| <i>AQI_{t-1}</i> | 0.056** (2.39) | 0.059** (2.56) | 0.060*** (2.58) | 0.056** (2.36) | 0.050** (2.11) | 0.053** (2.24) |
| <i>Intercept</i> | 1.729*** (11.32) | 1.726*** (11.30) | 1.727*** (11.31) | 1.726*** (11.30) | 1.727*** (11.31) | 1.726*** (11.31) |
| WTP estimate (%) | 3.533 | 4.556 | 4.946 | 4.698 | 1.625 | 2.717 |
| Observations | 26476 | 26476 | 26476 | 26476 | 26476 | 26476 |
| Pseudo R-squared | 0.0064 | 0.0063 | 0.0063 | 0.0064 | 0.0063 | 0.0063 |

- WTP estimate = 3.5% (= 0.056/1.585) in Column (1)
- Overall, investors are willing to give up 1.6%-4.9% of ESG funds for clean air.

Empirical results (ex-post alpha)

- Following the methodology in Nofsinger and Varma (2014), we calculate a separate risk-adjusted abnormal return of the high AQI and low AQI periods.
- The model specification with Carhart's (1997) four-factor model is as follows:

$$r_t - r_{f,t} = \alpha_{Low} \mathbf{LowAQI}_t + \alpha_{High} \mathbf{HighAQI}_t + \beta_{MKT}(r_{mkt,t} - r_{f,t}) + \beta_{SMB}SMB_t + \beta_{HML}HML_t + \beta_{UMD}UMD_t + \varepsilon_t$$

- r_t : the monthly return on an equally weighted portfolio of funds in month t
- $r_{f,t}$: the risk-free rate
- $r_{mkt,t}$: the value-weighted market index return
- $\mathbf{HighAQI}_t(\mathbf{LowAQI}_t)$: a dummy variable that is equal to one if the previous three-month rolling average of monthly AQI is above (below) the median value and zero otherwise.
- SMB_t : the difference in returns between a small-cap portfolio and a large-cap portfolio
- HML_t : the difference in returns between a portfolio of high book-to-market stocks and a portfolio of low book-to-market stocks
- UMD_t : the difference in returns between a portfolio of past 12-month winners and a portfolio of past 12-month losers.

Empirical results (ex-post alpha)

Table 6. Ex-post fund performance and factor loadings

| Panel A. Alpha during the entire period | | | | | | |
|--|------------|-----------|----------------|----------|----------------|----------|
| | CAPM Alpha | | 3-factor Alpha | | 4-factor Alpha | |
| ESG funds | 4.784 | | 4.465 | | 4.261 | |
| | (1.04) | | (1.42) | | (1.41) | |
| Non-ESG funds | 5.079 | | 4.813** | | 4.653** | |
| | (1.43) | | (2.49) | | (2.62) | |
| Difference | -0.295 | | -0.347 | | -0.391 | |
| | (-0.15) | | (-0.17) | | (-0.20) | |
| Panel B. Alpha during the separate high and low AQI period | | | | | | |
| | Low AQI | | | High AQI | | |
| | CAPM | 3-factor | 4-factor | CAPM | 3-factor | 4-factor |
| ESG funds | 13.805** | 12.158*** | 11.015*** | -4.404 | -3.358 | -2.580 |
| | (2.21) | (2.93) | (2.69) | (-0.69) | (-0.87) | (-0.71) |
| Non-ESG funds | 9.689** | 8.387*** | 7.461*** | 0.383 | 1.178 | 1.808 |
| | (2.14) | (3.69) | (3.43) | (0.07) | (0.41) | (0.70) |
| Difference | 4.115 | 3.771 | 3.554 | -4.787** | -4.536* | -4.388* |
| | (1.32) | (1.27) | (1.18) | (-2.09) | (-1.98) | (-1.92) |

- Alphas for the ESG funds are not significantly different from the conventional fund alphas.
- Following the low AQI periods, the ESG fund alpha is not significantly different from the non-ESG fund alpha.
- Following the high AQI periods, the ESG funds significantly **underperform 4.4 to 4.8%** the non-ESG funds.

Robustness tests

(1) Alternative specification of AQI

- $AQI_{hq_{i,t-1}}^{High}$: a dummy variable equal to one if the value of the PM2.5 index of the city where the respective fund i 's headquarters is located is above the median cross-sectional value in quarter $t-1$.
- Results are not changed.

(2) Supply-side fund managers' decisions

- The environmental concerns can affect fund managers' decisions and motivate them to create new ESG funds.
- $ESGInception_{j,t} = \Lambda(\text{LnFamTNA}_{j,t}, \text{NumFamInception}_{j,t}, \text{NumESGInception}_t, \text{ESGReturn}_t) + \varepsilon_{j,t}$
- AQI **does not affect** the fund manager's inception decision (supply-side channel).

(3) Ex-post alpha: inclusion of ESG factor

- To further investigate fund performance and exposure to an ESG factor, we include *ESG* factor.
- ESG funds have significantly **higher exposure to the ESG factor** than non-ESG funds.
- ESG funds **underperform** their conventional matching funds following the high air pollution periods.

(4) DID tests on funds' future performance

- To mitigate a potential endogenous concern, we use the difference-in-difference analysis on funds' future performance.
- On January 1, 2016, the Chinese New Air Prevention and Control Law came into effect to curb greenhouse gas emissions.
- The governmental actions to implement the New Air Law may reduce air pollution and may cause a **decrease** in the **underperformance** of ESG funds.

Summary: empirical results

- This study shows that Chinese ESG funds act as impact investments and thus sacrifice financial returns in exchange for clean air.
- During the high air pollution period,
 - the **flow-performance relationship** of ESG funds becomes **weaker**
 - investors are likely to invest in ESG funds, ESG funds **underperform** conventional funds following the high air pollution period.
- ESG investors **may sacrifice their return for clean air**,
 - willing to pay 1.6%-4.9% on the ex-ante basis
 - yield 4.4%-4.8% lower risk-adjusted abnormal returns than non-ESG based on the ex-post alpha estimation.

Contribution

- To the best of our knowledge, this is one of the pioneering studies that relate air pollution to ESG mutual funds in China.
 - Taking a holistic approach to the overall assessment of **flows** and **performance**.
 - Extends the literature on ESG investor behaviors in **emerging markets**.
- We provide new evidence that investors are **willing to pay** for environmental impact and ESG funds act as impact investment products during high air pollution periods.
 - Provide ex-ante WTP and ex-post fund alpha calculations.

Appendix

Robustness test (1): alternative specification of AQI

- $AQI_hq_{i,t-1}^{High}$: a dummy variable equal to one if the value of the PM2.5 index of the city where the respective fund i 's headquarters is located is above the median cross-sectional value in quarter $t-1$.
- Consistent with the results in Table 3, further support H1.

Table 7. AQI and Flow-performance relationship: alternative specifications of AQI

| | ESG funds (1) | Non-ESG funds (2) | All funds (3) |
|---|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| $Perf_{i,t-1} * AQI_hq_{i,t-1}^{High} * ESG_i$ | | | -5.509** (-2.26) |
| $Perf_{i,t-1}$ | 2.164 (1.60) | 2.142*** (2.91) | 2.108*** (3.10) |
| $Perf_{i,t-1} * AQI_hq_{i,t-1}^{High}$ | -5.861** (-2.26) | -0.565 (-0.47) | -0.544 (-0.45) |
| $AQI_hq_{i,t-1}^{High}$ | 3.813** (2.10) | 0.013 (0.02) | -0.018 (-0.02) |
| $LnTNA_{i,t-1}$ | -1.694*** (-2.97) | -2.037*** (-3.73) | -1.954*** (-4.54) |
| $LnAge_{i,t-1}$ | 2.034*** (2.01) | 1.268* (1.06) | 1.419** (2.74) |

Robustness tests (2): supply-side decisions

- The environmental and sustainability concerns can affect fund managers' supply-side decisions and motivate them to create new ESG funds.

$$ESGInception_{j,t} = \Lambda(LnFamTNA_{j,t}, NumFamInception_{j,t}, NumESGInception_t, ESGReturn_t) + \varepsilon_{j,t}$$

- $ESGInception_{j,t}$: a dummy variable equal to one when a fund family j has inception of an ESG fund in a given quarter t and zero otherwise.
- $LnFamTNA_{j,t}$: the natural logarithm of fund family TNA in quarter t .
- $NumFamInception_{j,t}$: the number of any mutual fund inception by fund family j in quarter t .
- $NumESGInception_t$: the number of ESG fund inception in the whole market in quarter t .
- $ESGReturn_t$: the equal-weighted return of ESG funds in a 12-month period ending at the end of the quarter t .

Robustness tests (2): supply-side decisions

Table 8. Determinants of ESG fund inception

| Panel A. Descriptive statistics (n=871) | | | | | |
|---|-------------|---------|---------------------|--------|--------|
| | Mean | Std.Dev | Median | Min | Max |
| $ESGInception_{j,t}$ | 0.031 | 0.173 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 1.000 |
| $LnFamTNA_{j,t}$ | 8.645 | 1.923 | 9.195 | -2.429 | 11.614 |
| $NumFamInception_{j,t}$ | 1.447 | 0.876 | 1.000 | 1.000 | 8.000 |
| $NumESGInception_t$ | 1.437 | 1.846 | 1.000 | 0.000 | 6.000 |
| $ESGReturn_t$ | 0.157 | 0.305 | 0.084 | -0.240 | 0.891 |
| Panel B. Logit regression | | | | | |
| | Coefficient | | Walt test value (z) | | |
| AQI_{t-1} | 3.566 | | 1.51 | | |
| $LnFamTNA_{j,t}$ | 0.546* | | 1.67 | | |
| $NumFamInception_{j,t}$ | 0.112 | | 0.32 | | |
| $NumESGInception_t$ | -0.208 | | -1.24 | | |
| $ESGReturn_t$ | 1.691** | | 2.53 | | |
| Intercept | -26.967** | | -2.48 | | |
| Observations | 871 | | | | |
| Pseudo R-squared | 0.151 | | | | |

- AQI **does not affect** the fund manager's inception decision (supply-side channel).
- However, family fund size and the equal-weighted return of ESG funds are positively associated with the new inception of ESG funds.

Robustness tests (3): ex-post alpha- inclusion of ESG factor

- To further investigate fund performance and exposure to an ESG factor, we include ESG_t factor.
- ESG_t : the excess return of the ESG benchmark index.
- We use the value-weighted return of the indices of CNI EP Index (index code: 399358), CNI CSR Index (index code: 399369), and CNI Corporate Governance Index (index code: 399322)

Table 10. Fund performance and factor loadings: including ESG style factor

| | Alpha | | MKT | SMB | HML | UMD | ESG | R-sq |
|---------------|--------------------|---------------------|---------------------|--------------------|----------------------|--------------------|--------------------|-------|
| | Low AQI | High AQI | | | | | | |
| ESG funds | 8.629*** (2.68) | -3.217 (-0.97) | 0.314* (1.84) | 0.213*** (2.70) | -0.533*** (-8.69) | 0.256*** (5.62) | 0.647*** (3.49) | 0.941 |
| Non-ESG funds | 6.639*** (3.09) | 1.588 (0.65) | 0.641*** (6.77) | 0.115** (2.23) | -0.492*** (-9.18) | 0.194*** (6.52) | 0.223** (2.13) | 0.967 |
| Difference | 1.990 (0.85) | -4.806** (-2.02) | -0.326** (-2.46) | 0.098 (1.64) | -0.041 (-1.09) | 0.062 (1.54) | 0.424*** (3.07) | 0.346 |

- ESG funds have significantly **higher exposure to the ESG factor** than non-ESG funds.
- ESG funds **underperform** their conventional matching funds following the high air pollution periods.

Robustness tests (4): DID tests on funds' future performance

- To mitigate a potential endogenous concern, we use the difference-in-difference analysis on funds' future performance.
- On January 1, 2016, the Chinese New Air Prevention and Control Law came into effect to curb greenhouse gas emissions.
- We use the following specification:

$$Alpha_{i,t} = \alpha + \beta_1 ESG_i * Post_{t-1} + \beta_2 ESG_i + \beta_3 Post_{t-1} + \gamma' Controls_{i,t-1} + \varepsilon_{i,t}$$

- $Alpha_{i,t}$: the future risk-adjusted performance fund i in month t based on the Carhart's (1997) four-factor model
- ESG_i : a dummy variable equal to one if the fund is the ESG fund
- $Post_t$: a dummy variable equal to one if month t is in the period after the law came into effect (2016-2017) and zero if month t is in the period before the law (2014-2015)
- $Controls_{i,t}$ includes fund size, age, expenses, fund return volatility, and past fund flows

Robustness tests (4): DID tests on funds' future performance

Table 9. Diff-in-diff tests on the air pollution law enactment

| Panel B. Multivariate specification | | |
|-------------------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| | (1) | (2) |
| $ESG_i * Post_{i,t-1}$ | 0.0052** (2.06) | 0.0055** (2.07) |
| ESG_i | -0.0049** (-2.34) | -0.0045** (-2.08) |
| $Post_{i,t-1}$ | 0.0118*** (8.34) | 0.0111*** (7.59) |
| $LnSize_{i,t-1}$ | | 0.0009** (2.57) |
| $LnAge_{i,t-1}$ | | -0.0025*** (-2.79) |
| $Expense_{i,t-1}$ | | -0.0132 (-1.40) |
| $Volatility_{i,t-1}$ | | -0.0481*** (-3.10) |
| $Flow_{i,t-1}$ | | 0.0000 (0.28) |
| Intercept | -0.0111*** (-9.66) | -0.0035 (-0.81) |
| Observations | 2684 | 2452 |
| R-squared | 0.048 | 0.063 |

- The governmental actions to implement the New Air Law may reduce air pollution and may cause a **decrease** in the **underperformance** of ESG funds.

Robustness tests (4): DID tests on funds' future performance

- To differentiate the impact investing hypothesis from the regulation hypothesis, we compare the underperformance of ESG vs. non-ESG funds that took place before the regulatory shutdown (the pre-law period) to the underperformance of ESG vs. non-ESG funds that took place after the regulatory shutdown (the post-law period). The DID test results show that first, a larger difference in underperformance is found between the two sets of pre-law period (5.851% (t-statistic = 2.35)), and second, insignificant difference during the post-law period (0.065% (t-statistics = 0.045)). Thus, the DID results support the impact investing hypothesis more than the regulation hypothesis because, during the pre-law period, ESG funds significantly underperform the non-ESG funds.

Robustness tests (4): DID tests on funds' future performance

| Panel A. Univariate specification | | |
|-----------------------------------|----------|---------------|
| | Alpha | (t-statistic) |
| Pre-law period | | |
| ESG (Treated) | -19.17 | - |
| Non-ESG (Control) | -13.32 | - |
| Diff | -5.851** | (-2.350) |
| Post-law period | | |
| ESG (Treated) | 0.887 | - |
| Non-ESG (Control) | 0.822 | - |
| Diff | 0.065 | (0.045) |
| Diff-in-diff | 5.916** | (1.961) |
| Observations | 2787 | |
| R-squared | 0.0469 | |