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
March 16, 2016

<https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/03/16/statement-press-secretary-executive-order-entitled-blocking-property>

# Statement by the Press Secretary on the Executive Order Entitled "Blocking Property of the Government of North Korea and the Workers' Party of Korea, and Prohibiting Certain Transactions With Respect to North Korea”

Today, the President issued an executive order imposing robust new sanctions on North Korea. This E.O. is part of our response to North Korea’s January 6 nuclear test and February 7 launch using ballistic missile technology, and it enables U.S. implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 2270 and the North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act of 2016.

These actions are consistent with our longstanding commitment to apply sustained pressure on the North Korean regime.  The U.S. and the global community will not tolerate North Korea’s illicit nuclear and ballistic missile activities, and we will continue to impose costs on North Korea until it comes into compliance with its international obligations.



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For Immediate Release

March 17, 2016

**Press Briefing by Press Secretary Josh Earnest, 3/17/2016**

[**https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/03/17/press-briefing-press-secretary-josh-earnest-3172016**](https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/03/17/press-briefing-press-secretary-josh-earnest-3172016)

Q The United States government, the administration has already launched a consultation with China in terms of the implementation of the sanctions?  
   
MR. EARNEST:  That's a good question.  We have talked since we saw the North Korea nuclear test and the subsequent test of ballistic missile technology there.  We've acknowledged that our success in applying additional pressure on the North Korean government would depend upon the effective cooperation of Chinese authorities. (우리는 북한에게 추가 압박을 가함으로써 얻는 성공은 중국 정부의 효과적인 협력에 달려있음을 안다.)  The reason for that is that China has a rather unique relationship with North Korea.  The North Korean economy is more dependent on the Chinese economy than any other.  The relations between the North Korean government and the Chinese government are more integrated than North Korea’s government-to-government relationship with any other country in the world.  And mobilizing an effective international response would require effective cooperation with Chinese officials.  
   
And that's what we have succeeded in obtaining.  And that is why we have been able to put in place sanctions against North Korea that go far beyond sanctions that we put in place against North Korea in the past.  So this will apply additional pressure not just to the North Korean government but also to the ruling elite in North Korea.  
   
Many members of the ruling elite enjoy rather luxurious lifestyles that seems in quite stark contrast to the suffering of the vast majority of the North Korean population.  That is a direct result of policy -- immoral policy decisions that are made by the North Korean government.  And we have looked for ways that we could apply sanctions to maximize the impact they would have on the North Korean ruling elite that is, after all, making the kinds of decisions that are destabilizing the broader region.  
   
Q    I believe that the U.S. unilateral sanctions that the President signed last month required the President to investigate any person and entity and individual if there is a suspicion to have a transaction -- a transaction with North Korea.  So is it fair to say if any person could have illicit transaction with this entity or individual which has been designated yesterday, and this entity would also be punished, including a Chinese company or Chinese national institution, is it fair to say that that party would also be sanctioned?  
   
MR. EARNEST:  Well, you're asking a very technical question -- it's an entirely legitimate one.  But my colleagues at the Treasury Department can help you understand exactly what sort of penalties are associated with violating these sanctions.  But I think the basic crux of your question is one that I can affirmatively answer, which is that the successful implementation of these sanctions will require the United States, Chinese and other countries in the region to coordinate effectively to enforce them.  And how exactly they’re enforced and what sort of penalties are associated with violating these sanctions are questions that my colleagues at the Treasury Department can answer.  
 

Sixth United States-Philippines Bilateral Strategic Dialogue Joint Statement

**Media Note**

**Office of the Spokesperson**

**Washington, DC**

**March 18, 2016**

<http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2016/03/254833.htm>

The United States and the Republic of the Philippines held the sixth Bilateral Strategic Dialogue (BSD) on March 17-18, 2016, in Washington, D.C. The annual dialogue supported and reinforced the Alliance across a broad range of shared values, interests, and priorities. The Dialogue was co-chaired by Assistant Secretary of State Daniel Russel and Assistant Secretary of Defense David Shear for the United States and Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs Evan P. Garcia and Undersecretary of National Defense Pio Lorenzo F. Batino for the Republic of the Philippines. Discussions reaffirmed shared commitment to strengthening the Alliance, in terms of ensuring both countries’ mutual defense and security, as well as jointly contributing to regional peace, stability, and economic prosperity.

On the occasion of the BSD, the two sides reaffirmed their commitment to the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1951, as articulated in the November 2011 Manila Declaration and more recently in the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA). 방위협력확대협정(EDCA) They noted agreement on five EDCA Agreed Locations encompassing portions of the following facilities and areas: Antonio Bautista Air Base, Basa Air Base, Fort Magsaysay, Lumbia Air Base, and Mactan-Benito Ebuen Air Base, and discussed next steps for implementation of the EDCA. The two sides discussed proposals to support the United States’ efforts to help modernize the Armed Forces of the Philippines, develop capacity and capability for maritime security and domain awareness, and provide rapid humanitarian assistance. The Philippines welcomed the intent of the U.S. Department of Defense to propose to the U.S. Congress that a significant amount under the Southeast Asia Maritime Security Initiative be allocated in Fiscal Year 2016 to the Philippines for mutually-agreed projects that directly support the country’s maritime security priorities. They committed to continue developing, planning, and executing defense cooperation activities to reinforce their respective national defense capabilities and interoperability, in the areas of maritime security and domain awareness, enhanced joint activities, humanitarian and disaster response, counterterrorism, cybersecurity, and information sharing. Along this line, they also provided strategic policy guidance to the Mutual Defense Board-Security Engagement Board (MDB-SEB) to enhance cooperation in addressing traditional and non-traditional security challenges.

Both sides reiterated their commitment to peace, security, and stability in the region, unimpeded lawful commerce, and freedoms of navigation and overflight and other lawful uses of the sea as guaranteed under international law. Both sides expressed their firm opposition to the ongoing militarization of outposts in the South China Sea and discussed their common view that the installation of new military assets on the outposts escalates tensions. They discussed options to address further militarization and unilateral actions in the South China Sea. The delegations from the United States and the Philippines reaffirmed that countries should clarify maritime claims in the South China Sea in accordance with international law as reflected in the Law of the Sea Convention and peacefully resolve or manage disputes, including through the use of peaceful dispute settlement mechanisms, such as arbitration.( 각 나라들은 남중국해에 관한 해상 요구들을 해상협정법에 나와있듯이 국제법에 따라서 뚜렷하게 확인하고 이의가 있을시에는 전문적 평화 중재 같은 방법을 쓰는것을 고려하면서까지 평화적으로 결정하고 관리를 해야한다) Both sides restated their views that the ruling in the South China Sea case before the U.N. Law of the Sea Convention arbitral tribunal would be legally binding on both China and the Philippines. They reinforced the importance of close cooperation and consultation in international organizations and bodies that support a rules-based international order providing a framework for peaceful resolution of disputes.



**John Kirby**

**Spokesperson**  
**Daily Press Briefing**

**Washington, DC**

**March 18, 2016**

[**http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2016/03/254832.htm#PHILIPPINES3**](http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2016/03/254832.htm#PHILIPPINES3)

**QUESTION:** when the agreement was signed several years ago but now the – today, the finalization of these locations – what kind of signal is this intended to send?

**QUESTION:** Not to the Philippines but to other countries, perhaps larger ones to the west.

**MR KIRBY:** What it signals is our commitment to our alliance with the Philippines and only our alliance to the Philippines. That’s what this is intended to signal, that that alliance is still strong and vibrant. We want to see it continue to be stronger and more vibrant in the future. No other nation in the region should take any other message away from this new agreement. It’s very much in keeping with, again, our security commitments there to the Philippines.

**QUESTION:** And I guess in anticipation of that complaint, which is going to come, why should other governments, particularly ones with whom the Philippines has disagreements with over territorial issues, not see this as provocative, the fact that there’s going to be rotational U.S. military in the Philippines?

**MR KIRBY:** Okay. A couple of thoughts there. First of all, there – we’ve made absolutely no bones about the fact that we take the rebalance to the Asia Pacific region very seriously. There are many components to the rebalance. The military component is just one of them. I am traditionally reticent to talk about military matters, but in this case, I think, given that I topped this off the dialogue, I’m going to speak a little bit about that. There has been – the rebalance has been realized in tangible ways across the Asia Pacific region, whether it’s ballistic – Aegis capable ballistic missile defense destroyers that have been based in Japan or additional air defense systems in Alaska at Fort Greely, and the additional presence of rotational – expeditionary rotational forces, be they Navy, Marine, Air Force, or even Army in the region.

And as part of our – first of all, this agreement has been long – a long time in coming and in discussion, but it’s very much in keeping with the efforts that the United States has put in to increasing our rotational and expeditionary capabilities there in the Asia Pacific region. It’s very much in keeping with that. I can’t speak for another nation and how they might react to this, but I can tell you that there’s nothing offensive or provocative with respect to any of the military capabilities that are permanently based in the Asia Pacific region or are going to be rotationally based in the Pacific region.

**QUESTION:** Okay. Well, good luck selling that to the Chinese. But anyway --

**MR KIRBY:** Wait, wait, it’s not about selling it to the Chinese or to anybody. It’s about meeting our security commitments in a serious alliance with the Philippines. That’s what this is about.

**Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet Admiral Scott H. Swift**

*Indo-Pacific Maritime Security Conference Australian National University(*인도양·서태평양 해상보안 회의)

*Canberra, Australia March 16, 2016*

*As delivered*

Over the past seventy years, this principled system has fostered a highly interconnected neighborhood in which exclusivity and hierarchy have no place. We are all locals here; there are no outsiders or subordinate states among the Indo-Asia-Pacific nations. We were all given voice after World War Two, regardless of economic stature, heritage, culture, form of government, or military strength.

Some nations do not see it this way and, seeking to right perceived imbalances or wrongs of the past, are abandoning the international rules-based system in the process. As a consequence, portions of the sea are besieged by word or deed to serve unilateral interests alone. Manifest by unprecedented examples of aggressive construction and militarization on disputed land features as well as legal appeals to historic pasts that are inconsistent with international law, there is a palpable sense that an arc of “might makes right” is returning to the region after more than seventy years of security and stability.”(공격적인 건축과 군대화를 시키고 국제법에 어긋나게 역사에 법적 분쟁을 일으키는 등 전례가 없는 예를 통해서 명백히 알 수 있듯이, "힘이 곧 정의" 라는 풍조가 70년에 걸친 보안과 안정을 걸쳐서 이 곳에 돌아올 것이라는 것은 아주 확실하다.) Attempts to justify these activities at sea are often based on channeling nationalist history outward, the sort of thing that may stoke patriotism at home, but has no place among responsible nations in international waters. 바다에서의 이런 행동들을 정당화하려는 움직임들은 대부분 집에서는 애국심을 불러일으키지만 국제해상에서는 전혀 도움이 되지 않는 민족주의적인 역사에 바탕되어 있다

It’s becoming increasingly clear that a contest is underway in the most vulnerable waters of the Indo-Asia-Pacific. As mentioned earlier, on one side is a potential return of might makes right after more than seventy years of stability. On the other is a continuum of the international rules- based system that has served us all so well, with limitless potential to continue to do so. Though larger nations are certainly affected by these new challenges to the freedoms we enjoy and to the rules-based system, in particular, smaller nations that border disputed waters are most vulnerable and increasingly alarmed by these disruptive trends.

There are two primary elements driving this anxiety. First is the disproportionate scope, scale and acceleration of the disruptive activities I have mentioned before, especially in contested areas and surrounding waters. Second is a lack of transparency about the intentions of some regional navies, coast guards and para-military forces under their command. (첫번째는 앞서 말했던 붕괴적인 행동들의 불균형한 영역, 범위, 그리고 가속도이다. 특히 논쟁하고 있는 지역과 그 주변의 바다 안에서의 행동들이다. 두번째는 이 명령에 따르는 지역해군들, 연안 경비대, 그리고 군부대들의 목적성이 뚜렷이 보이지 않는다는 것이다.)

The resulting climate of uncertainty not only threatens freedom of the seas and chips away at the rules-based system, it encourages nations to transfer ever larger shares of national wealth to purchase naval weapons beyond what is needed merely for self-defense. More and more media reports reflect broad concern for rising military budgets, as well as calls for greater transparency and a clear explanation of intentions.

Relatedly, and most troubling, are the undeniable signs of militarization in select parts of the region, unprecedented in terms of scope and scale. The seeds of this militarization were sown by garrisons established decades ago in barely habitable outposts. Now many of their original blockhouses are dwarfed by thousands of acres of reclaimed land with newly constructed barracks, deep-water ports, extended runways, high power radars, surface-to-air missiles and squadrons of naval aircraft.

Recent restrictions on Internet and press freedoms by some nations may very well reflect their true intentions toward all forms of international exchange. Freedom across cyberspace may be less tangible than freedom of navigation for ships at sea, but it is no less consequential in today’s interconnected world. Successful imposition of restrictive national laws in international waters would likely require militarization. For these reasons, I remain concerned that the freedom of the seas in some Indo-Asia-Pacific waters is not only at risk by longstanding challenges like piracy, smuggling, and other illicit activities, it is increasingly vulnerable to a state-led resurgence of the principle of “might-makes-right.”

* Hope that the international rules-based system that has served us so well, regionally as well as globally, for the last 70 years, will remain the gold standard for issue resolution. We have only to look as far as the nations that border the Indian Ocean for an example and an affirmation, that nations great and small [can], and are, valued by, what up to now, has been an enduring model of issue resolution and stability.
* Concern that my example of standing in the middle of the Indian Ocean, what I view as a relative sea of tranquility, and looking west into the increasing chaos of the Mediterranean and Black seas, may be analogous to looking through a window at a potential future for the Indo- Asia-Pacific region.
* And last, that the reality is, demonstrated from the days of sail, the great British, French and Spanish armadas, as true today as then, that the canary in the coal mine of regional and global stability and prosperity isn’t found in a cave, but on international waters. We all have assumed so long these international seas are the domain of all free men. Perhaps now we too easily dismissed these freedom enablers, these guarantors of stability and prosperity, as simply “freedom of navigation.”

In closing on the theme of this conference, “Challenges, Opportunities and Cooperation,’ I suggest, while we can admire the example set for us by our Indian Oceans friends, we all have an obligation to ensure that the “opportunity” the Indian Ocean example presents to us is leveraged to ensure that all rise to the “challenge’ of ensuring this sea of tranquility does not become an oasis, more defined by the chaos that surrounds it, than by the stability within. The key to ensuring the longevity and application of this Indian Ocean model throughout the rest of the

Indo-Asia-Pacific region is “cooperation.” Cooperation in the form of applying the same

international rules-based system of accepted norms, standards, rules and laws that have served so well, so long, well into the future.