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**権力集中を進める習近平の「脆弱性」**

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ワシントンポスト紙コラムニストのイグネイシャスが、10月26日付の同紙で、習近平への権力集中が大方の予想を上回って進んだことが、逆に習近平体制を脆弱にすると論じています。論旨は以下の通りです。

習近平は、今回の党大会で華々しく自らの支配を見せつけたが、一部の観察者は、習近平が実は背伸びしているのではないかと考えている。習近平は、第19回党大会という舞台を完全に支配していたし、彼の権力は集団指導体制を崩し、毛沢東や鄧小平のような存在になろうとしている。「習近平思想」は、今や「新時代」の指導原理となったのだ。

　 パミール・コンサルティング会社のレポートによると、習近平政権の最初の五年における反腐敗キャンペーンで、153万の党員が調査を受け、27万8千人が起訴された。その中には、440人の部、省レベルの幹部、そして43人の中央委員が含まれている。軍も、1万3千人の幹部がクビにされ、50人を超える将校が汚職によって投獄された。習近平は、その結果、空席となったポストを埋めている。習近平によって補充された幹部は今や中央委員会の20％を占める。

　 習近平は派閥闘争でも優位に立っている。パミールによると、25人の政治局委員のうち、17人が彼の仲間である。政治局常務委員会では、7人のうち、4人が習近平派に属する。そして、ここ数十年で初めて、後継者となる人物が常務委員会に入らなかった。このことは、習近平が2期10年の定年制を無視しようとしていることを示す。

　 このような急速な権力の強化によって、何が起きるのか。一部の分析者は、習近平の支配が完全となった結果、それが脆弱性になると論じる。習近平は経済と外交を完全に司るため、いかなる挫折も彼個人が責められることになる。

　 習近平は、自らに対する反対を懸念しており、最近、ある党内文書が、党の指導、共産党の歴史、中国の伝統文化と国家の英雄に対する批判を禁止したという。それはつまり、習近平に対する批判を禁止するのと同義である。

　 習近平の野望は国内あるいは個人の権力に限らない。彼は党大会で中国が2050年までに技術、金融、安全保障において支配的な「近代化強国」になることを目標としてあげた。5年前、中国が目指していたのは地域強国であった。それが今や習近平は中国が新たなグローバル秩序を作ると言っている。

　 トランプの米国は難しい問題に直面している。習近平は今やトランプの好意に報いるつもりだし、トランプ訪中を盛り上げ、盛大な歓迎儀式の後には、双方の家族を含めた写真写りの良い会合を開く予定である。トランプ＝習会談の「達成事項」はおそらく北朝鮮問題と貿易となるだろう。習近平は楊潔篪元駐米大使を外交担当副総理にするようだ。

　 中国の戦略家は伝統的に、実際の勢力よりも自らを弱く見せることで敵を驚かせるのが賢明であると論じてきた。このやり方は今や君主のように君臨する習近平には不可能である。彼は、表面の派手な強さの内側にある脆弱性を自覚しなければならない。

出典：David Ignatius ‘Xi Jinping is more vulnerable than you think’ (Washington Post, October 26, 2017)

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<http://www2.jiia.or.jp/en_commentary/201711/22-1.html>

**The Domestic and Foreign Policies of the Second Xi Administration**

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| Akio Takahara ([高原明生-東京大学教授)](http://www2.jiia.or.jp/en_commentary/201711/22-1.html) | 22 November 2017 |

* Xi Jinping has gained paramount authority and the collective leadership that characterized the Post-Mao Zedong era has virtually ended.
* Xi Jinping announced the need to meet people's daily increasing desire for democracy, rule of law, equality, justice, etc., but presented few concrete measures.
* On external policy, it is likely that China will continue taking a mixed hardline/softline stance.

With the National Congress and the first plenary meeting of the new Central Committee finished, the second Xi Jinping administration has now been formed. Personnel changes at state institutions will not officially take effect until next spring, but informal arrangements have been made. It seems likely that Premier **Li Keqiang**, the second-ranked member of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), will retain his position, third-ranked **Li Zhanshu** will be named Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, fourth-ranked **Wang Yang** will be made Chairman of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, fifth-ranked **Wang Huning** will be assigned organizational, ideological and other duties within the CCP while serving concurrently as first secretary of the CCP's Central Secretariat, sixth-ranked **Zhao Leji** will become Secretary of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, and seventh-ranked **Han Zheng** will be appointed first deputy prime minister of the State Council.

 There had been discussions beginning last year about resurrecting the party chairmanship, but ultimately the secretary-general system, together with the division of responsibilities between the Politburo Standing Committee and the Central Politburo members, was maintained. In form, there do not appear to have been any changes in the collective leadership system.

 In substance, however, the collective leadership system has undergone a significant transformation.

**The first Xi Jinping administration had already established two new cross-sectional party organizations**: the Central Leading Group for Comprehensively Deepening Reforms (中央全面深化改革领导小组) and the Central National Security Commission (中央国家安全委员会). By assuming the top posts in these organizations, Xi Jinping has institutionally secured command authority over areas in which authority had originally been held by other Central Politburo members.

 **Secondly, "Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for the New Era** (习近平新时代中国特色社会主义思想)**"** has been newly incorporated into the CCP's constitution as guiding principles constituting an orthodox ideology. This is the first time since Deng Xiaoping Theory was adopted that such guiding principles have been entitled with a leader's name, and not since Mao Zedong Thought had they been named after a leader still in power. Xi Jinping has assumed overwhelming authority within the CCP, and he is being promoted in a way reminiscent of the cult of personality around Mao Zedong during the Cultural Revolution, as evidenced, for example, by his enormous photograph in the front page of *People's Daily*. Authority and power are steadily being concentrated in the hands of Xi Jinping.

 What policies will the new administration pursue? Attention was focused on the change in the "principal contradiction facing society," declared at the recent Party Congress to be "the contradiction between unbalanced and inadequate development and the people's ever-growing needs for a better life (民日益增长的美好生活需要和不平衡不充分的发展之间的矛盾)." According to Xi Jinping, the needs to be met for people to live a better life include "not only material and cultural needs but also their demands for democracy, the rule of law, fairness and justice, security and a better environment." While this description does indicate recognition of the problem at hand, no solutions to this principal contradiction such as income redistribution or the realization of political rights were presented. Conspicuous instead were the insistence on strengthening leadership by the CCP, the frequent use of abstract slogans, and an emphasis on nationalism.

 On foreign policy, Xi Jinping expressed his intent to continue taking a mixed hardline/softline stance. In his speech, he insisted that China remain on a path of peaceful development and encouraged the building of a human community bound together by a common destiny. At the same time, he vowed that China would never abandon its national interests, urging "full adherence by the Party to the doctrine of a strong military for a new era that requires a strong country and a strong military."

 What impact will Xi Jinping's growing power have on domestic and foreign policy? Although this power will enable him to pursue bold approaches on difficult issues, there are concerns that such a concentration of power in a single leader could result in errors in judgment and abuses of power. Strengthening the CCP's leadership in certain respects also goes against the current of modernization, characterized by institutionalization, establishment of the rule of law, and transition to a market economy. A careful eye should be kept on the degree to which the CCP will demand the establishment of party organizations within companies and their participation in company management.

 Stability within the top political tier will make it easier for the administration to adopt a moderate foreign policy without fear of criticism. Nevertheless, Xi Jinping's personality as well as the efforts of those around him to accommodate his wishes could become increasingly apparent in the country's actions vis-à-vis the rest of the world. Should policy failures or bureaucratic inaction cause the economy to further decelerate, the administration could approach Japan in hopes of securing economic benefits. In the event of social instability, though, Xi Jinping might be increasingly tempted to resort to conflict with a "foreign enemy" as a means of rallying the country around the administration.