**2020-06-10 벙커 자료 : 인도 태평양**

**김민경**

**6.5 (금) 외교부 보도 자료 – 이태호 2차관, 크라크 미 국무부 경제차관** **통화**

□ 이태호 2차관은 6.5.(금) 오전 키이스 크라크(Keith J. Krach) 미국 국무부 경제차관과 전화통화를 갖고, 그간 양국 정부가 코로나19 대처에 상호 협력해 온 점을 평가하면서, 한미 고위급 경제 협의회 (Senior Economic Dialogue, SED), 미국의 세계 경제 안보 구상 등 한·미간 경제 분야 주요 관심사에 대해 의견을 교환하였다.

ㅇ 양 차관은 한미 고위급 경제협의회(SED)의 양측 수석대표로서, 6월말 차기 한미 고위급 경제협의회(SED)의 사전준비를 위한 국장급 협의를 화상회의 방식으로 개최하고, 하반기 중 미국에서 제5차 협의회를 대면회의 방식으로 추진하기로 함.

ㅇ 크라크 차관은 **경제 번영 네트워크(Economic Prosperity Network) 구상**을 포함해 미국이 관심을 갖고 있는 다양한 국제 경제 이슈에 대해 설명하였고, 양측은 앞으로 이에 대해 **지속 협의**해 나가기로 함.

ㅇ 한편, 크라크 차관은 최근 한미 정상통화(6.1.)에서 미측이 G7 정상회의 확대 구상과 함께 **G7 정상회의에 한국을 초청**하였고 한국이 동 초청을 수락한 데 대해 사의를 표하였으며, 관계국간 협의를 통해 좋은 결실을 맺게 되기를 기대한다고 언급함.

**6.2 (화) The Geopolitics 기사 발췌 : Taiwan’s New Southbound Policy in the Indo-Pacific**

(<https://thegeopolitics.com/taiwans-new-southbound-policy-in-the-indo-pacific/>)

...... the NSP which was designed to strengthen Taipei’s economical, technological and educational relations with Southeast Asia, South Asia and Oceania. Interestingly, at the Indo-Pacific Dialogue in April 2019 at Taipei City, Tsai stressed the possible ways of cooperation between Taiwan’s NSP and United States’ vision for a Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP). So the future of NSP revolves to comply with a rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific.

**Assessing NSP**

...... The NSP is unique in its priorities and different from the predecessor Go South Policy (GSP) initiated by Lee Teng-hui in 1994. The GSP  initiated  for greater trade relations with Southeast Asia. But the scope of NSP  is not limited to trade and it encompasses strategic, economic, cultural and educational aspects. The financial budget provided for NSP and its substantial increase over the last couple of years shows the priorities of Taipei to increase its strategic depth in the Indo-Pacific.

**Converging Priorities: FOIP and NSP**

Amidst the geopolitical shifts, there are some points of intersection in policies of the United States and Taiwan in the Indo-Pacific. While the U.S. is advancing for an open and inclusive Indo-Pacific by the FOIP, Taiwan with its NSP also upholds similar priorities in its strategy. For Taipei primarily aligning with FOIP will invite more recognition and significance in the regional security architecture. In 2017, Taipei outlined five possible projects under the NSP which includes medical cooperation, industrial supply chains, policy forums, youth exchanges and regional agriculture. Incidentally, there is an increase in the number of [migrant workers in Taiwan](https://www.bangkokpost.com/opinion/opinion/1596118/re-imagining-taiwans-ties-with-asean) from ASEAN countries. The country is also becoming  a hub of education for South and Southeast Asian students.

As pointed out by **Denny Roy** in his [report](https://www.nbr.org/publication/taiwans-potential-role-in-the-free-and-open-indo-pacific-strategy/) for The National Bureau of Asian Research, the United States should take a sensible middle path to quietly support Taiwan’s efforts to improve its standing in the Pacific islands. This will help Taiwan to fulfil its potential as a contributor to FOIP.

**The China Factor**

For Beijing the NSP evolved as a blueprint to challenge natural autonomy of China over Taiwan. Due to the enactment of Anti-Secession Law in 2005, any anti-PRC collective actions will invite military response from Beijing. Taipei via NSP supports India and Japan’s Asia-Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC), However, it is also an implicit[counter](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13439006.2019.1618602) to the Maritime Silk Road (MSR) Initiative of the PRC(people’s republic of China).

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**6.3 (수)** **National Defense University Press 간행물 발췌 : Just Another Paper Tiger?**

**Chinese Perspectives on the U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy**

By Joel Wuthnow Strategic Forum 305

(<https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/Article/2206692/just-another-paper-tiger-chinese-perspectives-on-the-us-indo-pacific-strategy/>)

**Key Points**

◆ Chinese officials have responded to the U.S. “free and open Indo-Pacific” strategy through a regional counternarrative that raises doubts about the motives and sustainability of U.S. leadership in Asia while presenting China as a partner of choice.

◆ Chinese analysts perceive the Indo-Pacific strategy as a form of containment based on stronger U.S. relations with Japan, India, and Australia. They assess that, if left unchecked, the strategy will reduce China’s influence and increase regional tensions.

◆ Chinese observers identify weak regional support as the primary constraint on U.S. strategy in Asia and advocate responding by improving China’s own relations throughout the neighborhood.

◆ U.S. messaging needs to offer assurances of U.S. commitments and evidence of regional contributions. These messages should be regularly reinforced in regional gatherings, even those hosted by China.

◆ Washington needs to maintain key relationships in the region but need not respond in kind to every Chinese overture. The strategy may also create new opportunities to negotiate with China on certain issues from a position of strength.

**Implications for the United States**

……One implication for U.S. policymakers concerns strategic messaging to China and the region. There is clearly a gap between Chinese and U.S. perceptions on the intent and focus of the Indo-Pacific strategy. Chinese officials and scholars have both discussed the strategy as a way to contain China and frustrate the BRI, diverging from U.S. perceptions that the strategy is designed, in part, to dissuade China from conducting policies that undermine the regional order, but not to stunt China’s growth or overturn its political system.

Chinese observers are also intensely focused on the quadrilateral dialogue and relations among the Quad countries, which support the larger containment narrative, while U.S. sources portray a much wider, whole-of government strategy, with key initiatives in all of Asia’s subregions.

There is probably nothing that U.S. officials can do to influence these perceptions. Chinese interpretations of U.S. strategy in Asia as a containment plot are deeply rooted and have persisted across recent U.S. strategic adjustments, including the rebalance to Asia. Specific concerns about U.S. trilateral initiatives and the Quad reflect growing anxieties that Washington is trying to orchestrate an **“Asian NATO”** around China’s borders.

These views continue to circulate widely among Chinese analysts, even if some are beginning to doubt whether the United States has the resources needed to execute a containment strategy…….