**IRIS**

**Rupture du contrat sur les sous-marins australiens : quelles conséquences pour l’industrie française ?**

**(https://www.iris-france.org/160439-rupture-du-contrat-sur-les-sous-marins-australiens-quelles-consequences-pour-lindustrie-francaise/)**

L’offre américano-britannique laisse en réalité perplexe sur plusieurs points.

En premier lieu, une des conditions que devait remplir Naval Group pour gagner le contrat australien était que les bateaux soient construits en Australie. L’objectif était de rebâtir de A à Z une capacité australienne dans le domaine de l’industrie navale dans la région Sud de l’Australie et Naval Group avait accepté que 60% de la valeur du contrat – environ 20 milliards d’euros – soient dépensés en Australie. C’était un objectif très ambitieux à atteindre. De ce fait, on voit mal comment un tel objectif pourrait être atteint avec un sous-marin américain à propulsion nucléaire à la technologie plus sensible que le sous-marin français, et en plus couvert par la législation américaine ITAR, très restrictive sur les transferts de technologie.

En second lieu, on voit mal les Américains ou les Britanniques développer un sous-marin spécifique pour les Australiens. On prendra donc soit le design de la Virginia Class américaine ou de l’Astute britannique. Ce sont de très gros sous-marins d’environ 7 500 tonnes, alors que le Barracuda français fait 5 000 tonnes et sa version australienne devait avoisiner les 4 000 tonnes. À tout ceci, il faut ajouter que les Britanniques ont connu de multiples retards et surcoûts sur leurs sous-marins Astute, qu’ils n’ont pu terminer de développer qu’avec l’aide d’ingénieurs américains. Le sous-marin vendu par les Américains et les Britanniques coûtera donc certainement très cher aux Australiens, la durée de réalisation d’un tel projet, qui n’a même pas été réellement envisagée, risque d’être très long et les Australiens ne seront pas près de sitôt de remplacer leurs sous-marins de la class Collins.

De ce fait, le sentiment est qu’Américains, Australiens et Britanniques ont signé un accord politique au niveau de leurs dirigeants, avec quelques grandes lignes directrices dont cette fourniture de sous-marins, mais que rien n’a réellement été défini pour mettre en place les termes de cet accord. Quand on connaît les difficultés pratiques auxquelles a été confrontées Naval Group dans le contrat australien, on a du mal à imaginer la faisabilité du projet américano-britannique sauf à ce que les Australiens renoncent au développement de leur industrie navale dans le sud de l’Australie.

**Institute for Security & Development Policy**

**China’s Health Diplomacy:**

(<https://isdp.eu/content/uploads/2021/09/Chinas-Health-Diplomacy-Taking-Forward-the-Health-Silk-Road-in-Southeast-Asia-FA-03.09.21.pdf>)

Beijing is also pushing forward its Health Silk Road (HSR), which, just like the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), leaves room for interpretation but mostly involves cooperating bilaterally and multilaterally in the healthcare sector.3 Such health projects already exist in the multilateral (ASEAN) and sub-regional (Mekong region) arrangement, making Southeast Asia (SEA) an obvious beneficiary of the HSR due to its proximity to China and their strategic partnerships. The HSR adds to China’s already existing health diplomacy by providing a framework for strengthening its role in medical supply chains and, more importantly, in regional and global health governance.4 Covid-19, in this way, has accelerated existing geopolitical trends of China’s ascendance towards attaining leadership in the region.

Under the China-ASEAN Health Cooperation Forum, different sessions on the pandemic have been held, for instance, in Laos in February and a web-based special ASEAN Plus Three (APT) Summit in April where Chinese Premier Li Keqiang proposed a series of new mechanisms to coordinate data regarding health, customs, production and transportation of medical supplies. Is Covid Vaccine Diplomacy Merging with the Health Silk Road in SEA? In the midst and aftermath of the Covid-19 pandemic, the HSR is likely to feature heavily in China’s foreign diplomacy. First, China’s health diplomacy, such as medical aid and capacity training, will be expanded under the HSR concept, and now with a more urgent sense after Covid-19, partly to repair the damage to its image and demonstrate China’s capability as a global leader. Second, there could also be an extra push towards ramping up public health infrastructure in developing countries so that a pandemic-like situation can be avoided in the future, as noted by an Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) note. Beijing is finally in the final stages of mass distributing its vaccines and is extremely vocal in the global alliance of 189 countries, having pledged equitable distribution of vaccines. China’s Covid-related assistance thus falls under its vision of a “community with a shared future”. It is almost reminiscent of the 2003 SARS outbreak, but this time China is much better prepared. First, the Chinese administration became more familiar with strong surveillance and quarantining while ensuring citizens are compliant; second, it inculcated a more robust organizational capacity to accommodate domestic requirements and third, it taught China about the significance of creating transnational health networks for public health management. President Xi Jinping has applied these lessons not just to control the pandemic but has been doing it as part of the HSR as well.

Japan too has embarked on the path of providing medical assistance with Japanese Foreign Minister Toshimitsu Motegi touring various countries in the region. Up till October 2020, Japan had pledged medical assistance of $1 billion to the Philippines, $100 million to the Mekong countries, $140 million for varying enterprises in Myanmar and individual loans of $280 million to the emergency budget support.41 The new Prime Minister visiting Indonesia and Vietnam for his maiden overseas trip and engaging in high-level official exchanges does speak volumes about the priority Tokyo is giving to SEA. There is no doubt that there is a competitive element to these initiatives with respect to Chinese influence in the region. As new variants of the Covid-19 virus emerge, it is expected that Japan will continue to emerge as a key player in policy coordination and information sharing.

**Bundesregierung**

**EU trailblazer in global efforts to fight the pandemic**

(https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-en/issues/europe/eu-globale-impfstoffverteilung-1922884)

At the Global Health Summit on 21 May in Rome, the G20 heads of state and government committed to a whole series of measures. Ursula von der Leyen, President of the European Commission presented a Team Europe initiative. It is to build production capacities in Africa, as well as facilitating access to vaccines, medicines and health technologies.

The initiative is backed by one billion euros from the EU budget and the European development finance institutions including the European Investment Bank (EIB). The goal is to enable Africa to produce 60 per cent of the vaccines it needs by 2040. Currently, the figure is only one per cent.